

# GA 1 : DISEC

# STUDY GUIDE

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Countering the Proliferation of Armed Drones  
to Non-State Actors in the Sahel Region

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Preventing the Weaponization of Humanitarian Aid in the Ongoing Sudanese Civil War

## **Agenda Item I:**

# **Countering the Proliferation of Armed Drones to Non-State Actors in the Sahel Region**

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## **Letter from the Secretary General**

Esteemed Participants and Honored Guests,

It is a profound honor to extend my most formal welcome to you as we convene for the 13th edition of the Bilkent University Model United Nations Conference, MUNBU'26. My name is Zehra Yıldırım, and I'm a senior year law student at İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University. As the Secretary-General of MUNBU 2026, I welcome you not only to a forum of debate but to a tradition of academic and diplomatic excellence that has defined our institution for over a decade.

The art of diplomacy is one of patience, precision, and profound responsibility. My own commitment to this discipline has been forged over nine years of active engagement within the international circuit—a journey that has evolved alongside my formal education in the Faculty of Law. These years have instilled in me a steadfast belief that the resolution of global conflict lies in the mastery of legal frameworks and the cultivation of refined statesmanship. It is this standard of rigor and intellectual integrity that I am committed to upholding throughout our deliberations.

Bilkent University stands as a bastion of higher learning, dedicated to the pursuit of truth and the development of future leaders. It is our distinct privilege to host you within an environment that reflects the visionary principles of the founder of our Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who declared: "Peace at Home, Peace in the World." Guided by this transcendent ideal, we are committed to providing you with the highest level of hospitality, ensuring that your experience is marked by the grace, professionalism, and mutual respect that our University and the Republic of Türkiye represent on the international stage.

MUNBU Conferences remain a premier platform where the complexities of the global order are met with the sharpest minds of our generation. As we embark on this 13th session, I invite you to embrace the gravity of your roles. Let us ensure that our discourse remains as sophisticated as the challenges we face, and that our hospitality remains as enduring as our commitment to justice.

I wish you all fruitful debates and a joyful conference. Should you have any inquiries, please do not hesitate to contact me via my email, [zehray@ug.bilkent.edu.tr](mailto:zehray@ug.bilkent.edu.tr)

Best Regards,

Zehra YILDIRIM

Secretary General of MUNBU'26

## **Letter from the Academic Team**

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen of MUNBU,

Welcome to Model United Nations of Bilkent University (MUNBU) Conference! We are delighted to have you as esteemed participants in the Disarmament and International Security Committee. In this committee, we will collectively address two of the pressing issues of our time – the weaponization in Sahel region and Preventing the Weaponization of Humanitarian Aid in the Ongoing Sudanese Civil War.

Throughout this process, we have acted in accordance with established standards of professionalism, responsibility, and academic integrity. Our approach has been structured, collaborative, and guided by a commitment to maintaining clarity, consistency, and accountability at every stage. We have ensured that all actions taken and decisions made align with the expectations and principles set forth by the committee.

We remain confident that our conduct and contributions reflect due diligence and a serious engagement with the responsibilities entrusted to us. We are committed to continuing this work with the same level of rigor and respect for institutional procedures.

Should you have any questions or need further clarification, please do not hesitate to reach out to us. You can contact us at your convenience via the provided e-mail address:

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**Bora Bulan**

Under Secretary-General

**Buğra Ermihan**

Academic Assistant

## 1. Introduction to the Agenda Item

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### **1.1. Overview of the Sahel Security Environment**

The Sahel region has become one of the most vulnerable as well as important hotspots of contemporary world politics.<sup>1</sup> It covers the whole of West Africa as well as Central Africa and extends to nations such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, as well as some parts of Nigeria. All these countries are located at a historic crossroads of poor governance, climate changes, colonialism, as well as violence from non state actors.

More than a decade, the state of security in the country has escalated from intermittent conflict to encompass a complex layer which not only entails jihadist insurgents, ethnic militaries, drug trafficking cartels, but also, more recently, coups that bring to power military junta. The state's failure to maintain control through the institutions, combined with the intermittent collapse of the civil order, further imperils the already fragile institutions' capability to function effectively.

In this context, non state armed groups have proliferated. Some that have ties to global jihadist movements draw on discontent over poverty and government repression. Others largely engage in crime patterns that include smuggling, kidnapping, and natural resource exploitation. While these groups have some other things in common, it is clear that they all have a talent for easily adapting to ever changing circumstances through asymmetric warfare.

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank. *The Sahel: Fragility, Conflict, and Climate Change*.  
[Central Sahel Monitor](#)

Traditionally, conflict in the Sahel region has revolved around conventional ground fighting involving small arms, ambushes, landmines, and hit and run attacks over difficult terrain. However, there is a paradigm shift taking place in the security environment. The entry of unmanned aerial systems in this unstable region marks much more than a tactical shift<sup>2</sup> it represents an altogether different perspective on threat definitions that much of the Sahel region's governments are hardly equipped to deal with.

## **1.2. Drone Proliferation and Emerging Trends in the Sahel**

There has been rapid and unchecked diffusion of drone technology around the globe. Originally developed for the military and the industrial sector, drones are now widely used for civilian purposes like photography, agricultural surveying, and infrastructure observation and surveying. Another reason for the rapid diffusion of drones is the fact that these are now widely available in the market.

In the Sahel, the ready availability of drones has also had some unforeseen consequences. Non state armed groups are grabbing commercially available drones and modifying them for use against others, and sometimes they're not sophisticated military drones but rather quad copters or micro fixed wing drones with explosives, cameras, or signal re broadcast capabilities. But

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<sup>2</sup> International Crisis Group. *The Central Sahel: Scene of New Climate Wars?* [The Central Sahel: Scene of New Climate Wars? | International Crisis Group](https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-sahel/100-central-sahel-scene-new-climate-wars)

they're not necessarily more sophisticated than they seem, because in an arena where government armies can't even afford basic air reconnaissance, they do constitute a major advantage.

There are a few disturbing trends that emerge:

First of all, drones are now widely used for both surveillance and intel purposes. These are operated by the fighting factions for purposes of monitoring their patrols, establishing the location of their checkpoints, and also tracking the movements of their rival factions or the government troops.

Secondly, there is also a trend that involves the use of civilian assets for warfare. These drones have grenades and explosives on them that are dropped on targets without much warning. While these attacks do not necessarily have major effects as would be seen through other aerial attacks, their psychological effects could be major.

First, drones serve as instruments of intimidation and domination. Seeing an armed drone overhead can be intimidating, demobilizing, or intimidating. Neighborhoods that have been wounded by conflict do not need drones further blurring the line between the conflict zone and domestic space.

Importantly, this has occurred to a great extent through unofficial channels and not through the official transfer procedures that are normally in place when transferring arms from one country

to the next. Unmanned aerial vehicles and parts are transported through unofficial markets and smuggling channels, among others, that are already used for the smuggling of fuel, guns, and drugs.

### **1.3. Significance of Armed Drones Regarding Regional and International Security**

The increasing adoption of armed drones by non state actors represents more than the next big thing in the evolution of warfare. It challenges the foundational underpinnings of security architectures that are particularly vulnerable at times of impaired state capacity. For Sahel governments, armed drones erode territory sovereignty in a different way. Drones do not respond to border controls like traditional territory threats. Most countries in the region do not possess radar systems or any form of low altitude airspace protection infrastructure.

For civilians, this is a deeply destabilizing factor. The presence of armed drones means increased uncertainty and fear, particularly in rural villages and camps for those who are displaced and lack protection. Their attacks come with little warning, and recourse is often impossible. This only serves to exacerbate any humanitarian crises and erode confidence in the government's capacity to protect them.

Internationally speaking, the growing use of armed drones in the hands of non state actors is a disturbing trend, because if left to proliferate, it could create a world where air based violence is

simply a handy option for irregular forces worldwide, because a disturbing trend is developing in the Sahel region, where armed drones have proliferated among non state actors and it is only a warning of what is to come elsewhere.

#### **1.4. Key Terminology & Definitions**

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS): These are remotely controlled or autonomous aircraft, which may be either civilian or military in nature and do not contain human pilots on board.

- Armed Drone: It is a UAS whose purpose is to or has been configured or modified to carry or deliver explosives or engage in kinetic strikes

Dual Use Technology: Those technologies that have peaceful uses but can be used for harmful purposes.

Non State Armed Actors: These are organized groups that use armed conflict and do not belong to any recognized military forces within states.

Proliferation: The expansion of weaponized or weapons relevant technology to new countries or actors that can occur outside of a formal regulatory scheme.

#### **2. Key Actors & Stakeholders**

In order to understand proliferation dynamics with armed drones within the Sahel region, we have to consider the actors involved. Contrary to traditional arms proliferation, proliferation with armed drones has multiple actors who at times interact with each other: armed non state actors who utilize the technology, weak states that are struggling to control the diffusion of the technology, states that have their own foreign policies that promote the diffusion of the technology, as well as international institutions that combat armed drones by using technologies that were adequate in the past. 2.1. Non State Armed In the Sahel, such armed groups are the key beneficiaries of the proliferation of drones. They work in zones where government control is weak, and the boundaries are porous. The use of drones provides them with a cheap means of outreach without necessarily employing a lot of fighters.

The most dangerous groups operating within this arena remain jihadist groups affiliated with al Qaeda and ISIS<sup>3</sup>, particularly those operating within the Sahel. They have proven capable of adapting to lessons drawn from other conflicts, which they then retooled for their territory. Drones, to a degree, fit this mold.

Drones have several advantages for these groups: first, they eliminate risk. Surveillance drones enable militant groups to discover the movements of the military without endangering their warriors. Secondly, drones exacerbate psychological fears, as even if armed drones do not inflict significant injury on civilians or security forces, the drones bring fear of uncertainty. Thirdly,

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<sup>3</sup> UN Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sahel*. <https://undocs.org/S/2023/725>

drones make it hard to attribute an attack since drones do not leave an exact location of where they were operated from.

Aside from the jihadist group, local militias and criminal organizations are also experimenting with the use of drones. They use these to protect illicit routes, reconnaissance against rival factions, and to intimidate people. It seems that the proliferation of drones transcends support by certain sects and has now become a reality in the conflict system of the Sahel.

## **2.2. Sahelian States**

The Sahel states are between the devil and the deep blue sea. Theoretically, states such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger should have control over their airspace, control their imports, as well as ensure that their arms spill not over to other actors, but technically, they lack the capacity to perform such an operation.

Several reasons explain the vulnerability. First, there is political turmoil that affects security planning. The medical literature shows that coups and transitions mean the government and policies change frequently, leaving little time for any form of regulation. Second, the military is overstretched. The security forces of most countries are preoccupied with the short term security threat posed by insurgents. They pay little attention to the long term security risks and challenges of technology. Third, airspace regulation below aircraft altitude is weak. Most countries in the Sahel region lack adequate airspace regulation below aircraft altitude. Most of the airspace that drones occupy below aircraft altitude remains unregulated. The countries' registration of drones

is not effective, and there is limited ability to detect and intercept the drones. Therefore, most countries respond to the use of drones when there is an adverse event.

This creates a worrying gap: drones let non state actors move fast acquiring, tweaking, repurposing while state responses stay mired in red tape and stretched budgets. As that gap widens, it convinces a growing truth: the state can't keep up with new kinds of threats, and its legitimacy takes a hit.

### **2.3. External State Actors**

Matters are complicated by external state players in the Sahel. Countless countries provide counterterrorism assistance, military training, arm sales, or security partnerships. They're often framed as stabilizers, but these efforts frequently produce unintended side effects for how drone technology spreads.

The underlying problem is export controls. Drones and drone parts cross borders, produced and sold by firms far away from the Sahel. When exporting countries have lax or uneven dual use rules, gear slips into informal markets and to non state actors. Even exports that are seemingly legal can derail if end use monitoring is weak, allowing for diversions of equipment.

There are also indirect consequences from international rivalry. While countries vie for influence, security assistance becomes fragmented: different partners, sometimes at the expense of stability, because quick military fixes trump long term outcomes. The resulting fragmentation makes coordination more challenging and reduces the likelihood of coordinated drone control standards.

In some cases, private military contractors and middlemen blur lines of accountability. Their involvement introduces more paths for drone tech to circulate outside formal oversight.

#### **2.4. International and Regional Organizations**

International and regional bodies set norms and laws on drone proliferation, though these often fail to translate into concrete action at lower levels. The United Nations' approach to Sahel security involves peacekeeping missions, sanction regimes, and counterterrorism frameworks. But these tools are designed for legacy weapons and organized armed groups, not rapidly diffusing technologies. The African Union focuses on regional ownership and collective security questions, well aware that Sahelian states cannot manage these problems in isolation. The AU does raise concerns about new conflict technologies within its peace and security framework, but real world action remains spotty due to limited capacity.

These sub regional organizations have some record on controlling arms and preventing conflict, although their influence has waned as politics have broken down and member states suspend them or secede after coups. Such vulnerability does not allow these organizations to coercively implement regional choices on certain security matters.

Within this set of groups, a common concern emerges: non militar drone uses exist at a nexus between arms control, terrorism, technology regulation, and protection of civilians. The present siloed framework makes it difficult to respond effectively.

## **2.5. Civilian Populations and Local Communities**

This is a problem in security dialogue, where the people actually affected are often not considered. In the Sahel region, people actually suffer direct effects of the use of weapons in drones, as a result of which they face injuries, trauma, and displacement. It is important to consider public attitudes toward the use of advanced technologies by non state actors, which reduces their confidence in state protection, a factor that might lead them to come to a ‘deal’ with weapons groups or engage in direct violence themselves. On the other hand, countermeasures to manage drones could actually affect civilians, limiting their use of drones for their benefit or for humanitarian purposes or improving their economies.

## **3. Previous UN Action**

The Sahel's proliferation of armed drones to non state actors has not occurred in a legitimate and organizational void. The UN has been concerned for many years about arms trafficking and terrorism in the region through a series of resolutions, missions, and monitoring activities<sup>4</sup>. These instruments were fashioned for a different era of security a world of traditional arms, inter state arms transfers, and identifiable secessionist groups. As a result, the UN's current response architecture remains ill prepared to respond to the pace of diffusion of drone technology.

### 3.1. Relevant UN Security Council Res

The UN Security Council has adopted a number of measures concerning issues such as terrorism, proliferation of arms, and instability within the Sahel region. Though no measure specifically targets drones directly, there are a number of measures that can be considered an indirect legal basis for combating the transfer of such drones to non state actors. Sanctions directed against groups that are linked to al Qaeda and ISIS ban the provision of arms, funds, as well as any kind of military assistance to the groups in question. In theory, this would include armed drones as well as their components.

The resolutions issued by the Security Council target regions such as Sahel, focusing on halting weapon trafficking, securing borders, and securing state authority. There is a constant reference to the association between illegal weapon trafficking and violence emanating from non state actors. However, very rarely do they explore weapon proliferation in a traditional sense that encompasses small arms, light weapons, and conventional weapons, neglecting new technology.

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<sup>4</sup> United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 2396 (2017)*. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2396\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2396(2017))

Peacekeeping and political mission mandates, as approved by the Council, all have the same marching orders: stabilize the ground, support governance, protect civilians. These directives address new and proliferating threats, yet rarely grant the mission's leadership the mandate or capacity to be responsible for monitoring or responding to drone activities. Consequently, drone activities are often out of the loop on UN reporting chains.

### **3.2. UN Counterterrorism and Sanctions Mechanism**

Apart from the resolutions within the Security Council, the UN has a series of anti terrorism bodies working within the UN structure to monitor threats and support member states. These bodies provide information, offer technical assistance, and promote compliance with international commitments and obligations.

However, these instruments also have an obvious limitation. The reporting on sanctions is linked to state reporting and intelligence sharing efforts that are irregular within the region of the Sahel. This is due to a lack of capability on the side of the affected states to identify violations concerning drones, to track supply chains, and to provide enough evidence to panels of experts at the UN level concerning drones that are being used for sanctions evasion. As a consequence, the topic of drones will hardly ever be on the attention of sanctions reporting.

In addition, sanctions regimes react completely to occurrences. Thus, they respond once breeches have been established rather than before technology transfer. Using drones acquired swiftly and secretly, this reaction creates a lag between a rising threat and a response from this system.

### **3.3. Arms Control Regimes and Their Limitations**

To deal with weapon proliferation, arms control regimes form the core of the UN's strategy. However, they were not formulated having civilian UAVs in mind. Take the Arms Trade Treaty as an example. It regulates the international transfer of conventional arms between states. While weaponized UAVs can be considered as military equipment by nature and as a result can be regulated by such a treaty regime, none of the UAVs used by non state groups in the Sahel region are weaponized.

This leads to an imbalance in structure.

The legal system requires well organized exporters, properlylicensed transfers, and end users who must be states. However, in the Sahel region, usually the diffusion of drones is carried out through online buyers, brokers, and the reuse of civilian drones already present in those zones.

Indeed, even when well intentioned countries export, downstream control is minimal.

### **3.4. UN Peace Operations and Field Level Constraints**

A crucial function within the Sahel region for peace and political missions, operated under the umbrella of the United Nations, is to monitor the level of security and protect civilians. However, their capacity to resist the proliferation of drones is affected by the mandate and realities on the ground.

Typically, there are no specific personnel or equipment for the detection of unmanned systems for most missions. Coverage of drones is normally based on hearsay or other forms of intelligence. Additionally, the operations for peace are limited by engagement regulations, giving them limited response leverage against an aerial threat when not under direct attack.

But this difference has significance. UN missions can monitor the effects of armed drones used by non state actors, such as civilian injuries and displacement, as well as fear, without being able to target those responsible or prevent future events. Thus, over time, confidence can erode within the UN's ability to respond to emerging threats to its member states.

### **3.5 Reasons that Current UN Sanctions are Inadequate**

However, the weakness of past UN acts is not a matter of lack of interest, but rather limitations in terms of structure and concepts. Traditionally, the UN has maintained different policy channels for managing arms control issues, fighting terror, and managing technology issues. Drones armed with weapons, deployed by non state actors, overlap all these categories

simultaneously. In addition, it is worth noting that UN reactions focus on state responsibility. This is in line with international law. However, it poses a major challenge in regions like Somalia where it is not clear whose responsibility it is. In situations where drones have been acquired illegally and used independently, this approach becomes ineffective. Additionally, there is a time lag factor. The laws and worldwide consensus take time to develop, whereas advancements in drone technology occur rapidly.

#### **4. Core Challenges**

The potential proliferation of armed drones amongst non state groups in the Sahel is a challenge that is not posed by traditional weaponry alone. The problem is not only related to defense; instead, there is an amalgamation of challenges related to law, politics, and humanitarian matters. What is most complicated is that advancements made within one domain may make another domain weak, thereby causing stagnation within the process of reducing the proliferation of drones.

##### **4.1. Accessibility and Dual Use**

A key challenge is the dual use of drone technology itself.<sup>5</sup> A great many of the drones that are entering the Sahel are not primarily used for any kind of weaponry or destructive purposes but rather for purposes of photography, agriculture, or land surveying and logistics. It seems very difficult to maintain a ban against these types of technologies altogether when they are being

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<sup>5</sup> International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). *Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)*. <https://www.icao.int/safety/UA>

used for legitimate and positive ends like economic development and when the distinction between legitimate and nefarious purposes is blurred or ambiguous.

For these deficiencies, the loophole has been exploited by non state armed groups. These non state armed groups purchase their drones for civilian use and then customize the drones. The point is that the loophole has not been addressed by regulation that aims at military drones only. Moreover, there is the risk that too much regulation could damage civilians and inhibit development, especially for areas that lack accessibility and could benefit greatly by the use of drones.

#### **4.2. Weak Border Control and Smuggling Networks**

There are also geographical issues in the Sahel region that are another major obstacle in the way. It is a large region with largely ungoverned territories and shares very lengthy and porous boundaries. Its boundaries are already helping in the smuggling of weapons, fuel, drugs, and persons, and drones are not lagging behind on these routes either. The smuggling gangs do not smuggle drone kits. Rather, they are smuggling batteries, cameras, motors, and explosive materials, among others, separately. In many countries within the Sahel region, border efforts are challenged by capacity limitations. The tracing of low volume but high value commodities such as components for drones is much more difficult compared to tracing conventional arms traffic. As such, the trafficking of drones often escapes notice until drones are discovered in conflict hotspots.

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#### **4.3. Attribution and Accountability**

Armed drones mean that there is a problem in attribute responsibility. This is due to the fact that, unlike in conventional bombing, drone bombing may be initiated remotely, and not in the affected zone, which makes it difficult to attribute responsibility. In the Sahel region, for example, different militant organizations operate in the same territory, and in the context of drone bombing, it becomes difficult for governments and international players to attribute responsibility. As a result, different players on the ground operate without fear of being bombed in return, and if there is no way of holding anyone accountable, the use of drone bombing becomes justifiable in a way that makes it easy for militant outfits to use heavily armed drones.

#### **4.4. Escalation and Civil**

Armed drones set a new escalatory threshold and level of civilian casualties. They make violence cheaper since organizations can attack without endangering their militiamen or engaging directly. This can mean an increase in bomb strikes and aggression levels. But for civilians, armed drones mean an extra level of insecurity since an attack<sup>6</sup> may occur with no forewarning at all, and even surveillance drones mean being under constant observation. This, too, exacerbates traumas already under way within IDP camps and rural settings. Finally, armed drones further blur any

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<sup>6</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). *Autonomous Weapon Systems and IHL*. [Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Selected Issues | International Committee of the Red Cross](https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-international-humanitarian-law-selected-issues)

lines between war zones and safety zones since organizations will mobilize drones from within civilian districts, increasing collateral dangers. Such conditions put civilians in crucial risk and challenge humanitarian international law.

#### 4.5. Institutional and Legal Gaps

At the end of the day, institutions and laws are unable to keep up with the pace of change in technology. Existing arms control regimes are focused on conventional arms and states as parties to conflict. Counter terrorism regimes include the funding and recruitment aspects, but not new tech. Airspace regulation either ignores drone activity or ignores low altitude drone flight in particular. There is thus a regulatory vacuum here that is causing drone proliferation to be ill defined in its governing body or level of coordination. There is thus no proactive reaction to the drone problem in the Sahel region, rather than a lack of concern.

## 5. Solutions & Policy Options

Covering the issue of armed drones in the Sahel region reaching non state actors requires a balance between technology and politics. There is no single solution to make everything right. The best course of action includes regulation, cooperation, and capacity development, but not actions that could negatively affect civilians and economic projects.

### 5.1. Enhancement of Export Controls and Surveillance

One big point of leverage here is the origin of drone technology. A good deal of the equipment used in the Sahel region is now being sourced from outside, and it just seeps in via civilian channels. More stringent export controls on high risk drone parts could help.

What's been happening is that instead of blanket bans, more focused approaches are possible, such as more stringent licensing for long distance UAVs, more effective tracking of so called critical components such as navigation equipment or release mechanisms on payloads, and more guidance on intended use.

There's work that could be done on the part of the exporting countries, in terms of monitoring use. These measures will not stop the proliferation of any and all systems, but they may increase the price, availability, and time required for non state actors to obtain and develop new systems.<sup>7</sup>

## **5.2. Regional Cooperation and Information Sharing**

Drone dissemination does not recognize borders. Militia activities take place on a vast geography, with a gap in state coverage.

The countries of the Sahel region would greatly benefit from common systems for exchanging information about incidents involving drones, trafficking routes, as well as new tactics that are emerging. Common efforts for simple levels of monitoring can provide early warnings about emerging patterns. The region would provide an opportunity to combine limited know how instead of developing them separately.

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<sup>7</sup> Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. *Arms Trade Treaty Text and Implementation*. <https://thearmstradetreaty.org>

There is a scope for the existing arms control<sup>8</sup> and security regimes in the region to be expanded to incorporate Drone related issues.

### **5.3. Developing Counter Drone and Airspace Governance**

In many Sahelian countries, there is no ability for detection or defense against drones. Closing this gap is not a function of high priced defense capabilities, but of targeted investments. Low cost technologies for countering drones, such as sensors for detecting drones or devices that temporarily disturb their signals, can at least provide a minimum level of protection if used responsibly. But a more defined legal framework for low altitude airspace<sup>9</sup> is required by countries if measures to enforce the ban are to be consistent and not solely reactive.

In a capacity building initiative, one should focus on training and sustainability. The importance of a system relies upon its ability to be maintained by and within the local community. In airspace management, being ready and prepared is more valued than technology.

### **5.4. External Supply Chains and Accountability**

The course of drone proliferation is largely influenced by external actors. But to limit the indirect influence here, the solution definitely involves a strict accountability regime side by side with increased transparency measures for the sale and subsequent employment of weaponry, rules for

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<sup>8</sup> UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). *Regulating Armed Drones*.

[UNIDIR\\_Use\\_of\\_Uncrewed\\_Aerial\\_Systems\\_by\\_Non\\_State\\_Armed\\_Groups\\_Africa.pdf](https://undisarm.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/UNIDIR_Use_of_Uncrewed_Aerial_Systems_by_Non_State_Armed_Groups_Africa.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Small Arms Survey. *Emerging Military Technologies in the Sahel*.

[SAS-BP-West-Africa-Sahel-Connection.pdf](https://sas-bp-west-africa-sahel-connection.pdf)

the involvement of private forces within the military sector, and required oversight for security assistance providers. There are complexities for the sellers here too with what may seem like a sweet deal now could resonate for years to come. Sanctions could make a difference; there is a need for consistency here.

## **5.5. Protecting Drones for Civil and Humanitarian Uses**

It is necessary that drone policies also protect the use of drones for civilian purposes.<sup>10</sup> Drifts play a very important role in activities related to agriculture, infrastructure, medical, as well as humanitarian, work in the Sahel. Access should not be denied to the extent that these advantages are affected. It is necessary that the distinction between military drones and civilian drones remains strictly maintained by means of exemptions in humanitarian work, assistance in civil drone registration, as well as protection against drone defeating technology.

## **6. Questions to Consider**

- The proliferation of armed drones is a paradigm shift in the playing field in the Sahel, with governments and non-government entities vying for power in light of ownership of the land and control of airspace.

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<sup>10</sup> UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). *Drones in Humanitarian Action. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Humanitarian Response | OCHA*

- These technologies find themselves at a crossroads, where they can assist humanitarian work or advance military goals. In doing so, there is a gray area between relief and military strategy.
- To what extent is the UN community pulling together with regard to arms control/terrorism topics such as non-state actors and drones?
- In what way do the porous borders and smuggling routes within the Sahel region worsen this issue by facilitating the passage of components of drones and even full drones?
- How would the implications be if weaponized UAS are turned against civilian populations, and how would that conflict international humanitarian law and human rights law?

## **Introduction to the Agenda Item**

### **1.1. Overview of the Sudanese Civil War**

The current Sudanese Civil War, which broke out on April 15, 2023, is the power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. What began as a dispute over the transition to a civilian led government has rapidly

evolved into a nationwide humanitarian catastrophe, taking place in the capital city of Khartoum and the long volatile Darfur region.

The roots of the hostilities can be traced back to the 2019, during the time of long time dictator Omar al Bashir. Following a brief and fragile period of civilian military partnership, the SAF and RSF collaborated in a 2021 coup to dissolve the transitional government. However, the alliance broke over the specifics of a proposed security reforms. The central point was integrating the RSF into the national army and expecting the chain of command that would govern them and integrate them to SAF in the end. These disagreements escalated into a full scale urban warfare, as both leaders viewed the other as an existential threat to their political and economic influence.

The humanitarian side of the war has been severe, marking it as one of the most severe crises of the 21st century. Millions of civilians have been displaced, both internally and as refugees to neighboring countries like Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan. The collapse of the healthcare system and the destruction of vital infrastructure have left the population vulnerable to disease and starvation, with international observers of international organizations like the UN reporting famine in several regions. In addition, the conflict has flared ethnic tensions, particularly in Darfur, where reports of mass killings and systemic human rights abuses have surfaced.

The Sudanese Civil War poses a complicated challenge for the UN and African Union, made worse by external actors seeking influence over Sudan's Red Sea coast and gold reserves. Model UN delegates should focus on securing a lasting ceasefire, enabling humanitarian aid, and supporting a transition to civilian democracy despite resistance from both sides.




\*Locations of the military groups through the Sudanese Map.

## 1.2. Humanitarian Situation & Key Facts

The humanitarian crisis in Sudan has escalated into a polycrisis, which means the situation has multiple variables characterized by the simultaneous collapse of food systems, healthcare, and civil protection. As of early post covid era, the United Nations addresses Sudan as the site of the world's largest displacement and hunger crises. The conflict is no longer a localized military struggle but a nationwide catastrophe where starvation and disease are being systemized either by design or through negligence as instruments of war. With more than half the population in need of assistance and humanitarian aid, the humanitarian response is limited by severe underfunding and deliberate bureaucratic and physical obstructions by both the SAF and RSF, making Sudan one of the most dangerous environments globally for aid delivery or International intervention.

### Key Facts:

- **Mass Displacement:** Approximately 12–13 million people have been forcibly displaced since April 2023. This includes 9.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and over 3 million who have fled to neighboring countries like Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt.
- **Confirmed Famine:** Famine conditions (IPC Phase 5) are officially confirmed in El Fasher (North Darfur) and Kadugli (South Kordofan). Over 25 million people half of Sudan's population face acute food insecurity.
- **Healthcare Collapse:** Between 70% and 80% of health facilities in conflict affected states are non functional. Sudan is currently battling a nationwide cholera outbreak with over 113,000 recorded cases across all 18 states.
- **Education Crisis:** Sudan is facing a generational catastrophe with 17 million children out of school. Roughly 90% of the country's school age population has had no access to formal education for two consecutive years.
- **Casualties:** While official counts are difficult to verify, conservative international estimates place the death toll at over 150,000, with hundreds of thousands of additional excess deaths predicted due to preventable starvation and medical neglect.
- **Protection Risks:** UN investigators have documented systemic conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) and ethnic cleansing, particularly in the Darfur region, where violence has been described by several international bodies as reaching the threshold of genocide.
- **Aid Obstruction:** Sudan is ranked as the third most dangerous country for humanitarian workers. In 2026, the World Food Programme (WFP) warned of pipeline breaks, meaning rations may be cut entirely for millions due to a \$600M+ funding gap and blocked transport corridors.



\*Replacements have increased to 3 million to different states

### 1.3. What is Weaponization of Humanitarian Aid ?

The weaponization of aid refers to the deliberate manipulation, obstruction, or redirection of life saving resources such as food, water, and medicine to achieve military or political objectives. In the context of the Sudanese Civil War, both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have manipulated the control of humanitarian assistance into their combat strategies. This practice transforms humanitarian neutrality into a tactical asset, where the denial of access is used to pacify territory, reward loyalty, or collectively punish communities suspected of supporting the opposition. By controlling who receives aid and who starves, the military parties in Sudan use the survival of civilians as a bargaining argument in their struggle for military and territorial control.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), operating primarily out of Port Sudan, have largely employed administrative warfare to restrict aid flow. By leveraging their status as the internationally recognized government, the SAF utilizes the Humanitarian Aid Commission

(HAC) to create a hidden wall of bureaucracy. This includes the frequent denial or delay of visas for international aid workers and the withholding of travel permits for convoys attempting to cross into RSF controlled territories, particularly in Darfur and Khartoum. Through these de facto borders between the RSF and SAF, both parties do not incline to respond to the allegations of the international organizations and justify their actions as defense.

As a respond to the active blockade of The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have relied on physical brutality and siege tactics to either receive the aid or respond with a second blockade to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The paramilitary group has been documented looting humanitarian warehouses and hijacking aid trucks to sustain its own supplies or to sell essential goods on the black market to fund its operations. A primary example of this strategy is the siege of El Fasher, where the RSF has blocked all commercial and humanitarian transport, creating a fabricated famine conditions to force military surrender. Furthermore, the RSF often targets local grassroots networks, such as Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), by detaining or executing volunteers or threatening international actors' volunteers, eventually dismantling the only remaining lifelines for damaged communities.

From the international law's perspective, these actions constitute a violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2417, which condemns the use of starvation as a method of warfare. The systematic obstruction of relief supplies and the targeting of humanitarian workers are classified as war crimes and may even reach the threshold of crimes against humanity. For Model UN delegates, understanding this weaponization is crucial, as it shifts the debate from a simple lack of resources to a complex challenge of humanitarian access and the protection of aid corridors against deliberate military interference.

## 1.4. Key Terminology and Definitions

- **Janjaweed:** Arab led militias mobilized by the former Bashir regime in the early 2000s to suppress rebellions in Darfur. They are the direct predecessors and senior advisors to the modern RSF.
- **Administrative Warfare:** The use of bureaucratic obstacles such as denying visas, travel permits, or closing border crossings to intentionally block or delay humanitarian aid from reaching enemy territory.
- **Weaponization of Hunger:** A military strategy where combatting parties deliberately destroy food sources or block food aid to weaken or force the surrender of civilian populations and rival forces.
- **IPC Phase 5 (Famine):** The highest level of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification. It indicates a total lack of food and basic necessities, leading to starvation and death.
- **Adré Border Crossing:** A strategic transit point on the Chad Sudan border that is critical for delivering aid into the Darfur region; its closure or opening is a major point of political contention.

- **Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs):** Local, civilian led mutual aid networks that provide essential services like food and medicine when international NGOs are unable to operate in conflict zones.
- **Cross line vs. Cross border Aid:** Cross line refers to aid moving across frontlines within Sudan, while cross border refers to aid entering from neighboring countries without necessarily having the central government's permission.
- **Security Sector Reform (SSR):** The failed process of attempting to integrate the RSF into the national army, which served as the primary spark that ignited the current civil war.
- **Sovereignty vs. Humanitarian Access:** The legal and ethical debate over whether the international community can bypass a state's government (SAF) to deliver aid if that government is blocking life saving supplies to its citizens.
- **Regional Spillover:** The risk of the conflict spreading into neighboring countries like Chad or South Sudan, potentially destabilizing the entire Horn of Africa.

## **2. Key Actors & Stakeholders**

### **2.1. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)**

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al Burhan, is the official national military and the internationally recognized governing authority of Sudan. Since the outbreak of war in 2023, the SAF has relocated its administrative headquarters to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The SAF views itself as the sole legitimate defender of the Sudanese state, addressing the conflict as a struggle to suppress an illegal rebel militia and a war against terror. Their military strategy relies heavily on aerial supremacy, utilizing fighter jets and combat drones largely supplied by regional allies to strike RSF positions in urban centers.


Politically, the SAF has maintained a tough stance in negotiations, often demanding the complete withdrawal of RSF forces from urban areas and civilian homes as a non negotiable precondition for a permanent ceasefire. While they command the loyalty of the traditional military establishment and parts of the northern and eastern regions, the SAF has faced criticism

### Air and drone strikes by the SAF

15 April 2023 - 29 November 2024



Target region █ Khartoum █ Darfur █ Other regions



for Administrative Warfare using their control over state bureaucracy to delay visas and permits for humanitarian aid destined for RSF controlled territories.

## 2.2. Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a powerful paramilitary organization led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Evolved from the Janjaweed militias of the early 2000s,

the RSF was formally planned to be integrated into the state military under the Bashir regime before turning against the SAF. The group is characterized by its highly mobile, light infantry tactics and its ability to seize and hold vast territories through rapid ground offensives. By early 2019, the RSF has consolidated control over nearly the entire Darfur region, including the strategic city of El Fasher, as well as significant portions of the Kordofan region and the capital, Khartoum.

The RSF presents itself as a revolutionary force fighting against the remnants of the old Islamist regime within the SAF. However, their reputation is incredibly negative by allegations of war crimes, including mass killings and ethnic cleansing in West Darfur. Strategically, the RSF utilizes its control over key agricultural and mining areas to fund its operations. Their refusal to integrate into the national army on the SAF's terms remains the central obstacle to a military resolution.

### **2.3. UN Agencies & NGOs**

- **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):** Functions as the primary coordinator for the international response. They advocate for humanitarian pauses and manage the funding appeals, which currently face a multi billion dollar deficit.
- **World Food Programme (WFP):** Responsible for emergency food distribution. They have been vocal in declaring famine conditions in North Darfur and are the lead agency challenging the weaponization of hunger by both factions.

- **UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency):** Manages the massive influx of over 3 million refugees into neighboring countries. They focus on border protection and providing shelter in overcrowded camps in Chad and South Sudan.
- **International Rescue Committee (IRC) & Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF):** These NGOs provide frontline medical care and malnutrition treatment. They often operate in the highest risk zones and have called for better protection of humanitarian corridors.
- **Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs):** Though local and grassroots, these are key stakeholders. They are volunteer led community kitchens and clinics that provide the only available aid in besieged cities where international agencies are blocked.

## 2.4. Regional and International Actors

- **United States:** Under the current administration, the U.S. leads the Quad diplomatic efforts. They have imposed targeted sanctions on leaders of both the SAF and RSF and are pushing for a transition to a civilian led government. U.S. President Donald Trump has drawn greater international attention to the region, describing the situation in Sudan in critical terms and referring to the ongoing immigration crisis as a potential opportunity for action.
- **Egypt:** A staunch supporter of the SAF. Egypt views a stable, traditional military in Sudan as vital for its own national security, specifically regarding border stability and its interests in the Nile waters.

- **United Arab Emirates (UAE):** Frequently accused by the SAF and UN experts of providing logistical and military support to the RSF. Officially, the UAE denies these claims and participates in international mediation efforts to restore peace.
- **Saudi Arabia:** Host of the Jeddah Talks. Saudi Arabia positions itself as a neutral mediator, focusing on short term humanitarian truces rather than taking a side in the military struggle.
- **Russia:** Russia maintains a complex role, seeking to secure a naval base on the Red Sea. While they have historically dealt with both sides, recent reports indicate they have provided fighter jets and hardware to the SAF to bolster their aerial advantage.
- **African Union (AU) & IGAD:** These regional bodies advocate for African solutions to African problems. They emphasize the need for an inclusive political dialogue and have consistently condemned external military interference that fuels the war.

### **3. Previous UN Action**

#### **3.1. Relevant UNSC Resolutions**

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has passed several critical resolutions since the conflict began, though their enforcement remains a significant challenge. **Resolution 2724 (2024)** called for an immediate cessation of hostilities during Ramadan, while **Resolution 2736 (2024)** specifically demanded that the RSF stop its siege of El Fasher in North Darfur. More recently, **Resolution 2772 (2025)** and **Resolution 2791 (2025)** extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts to monitor the Darfur arms embargo. Additionally, the termination of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) via **Resolution 2715** addressed a shift toward a purely humanitarian and diplomatic monitoring presence rather than a political transition mission.

#### **3.2. UN Humanitarian Mechanisms**

The humanitarian response is led by the **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)**, which manages the Sudan Humanitarian Fund and coordinates the efforts of various agencies. The **World Food Programme (WFP)** is at the front of the hunger crisis, managing complex supply chains to reach famine hit areas like the Zamzam camp. **UNICEF** focuses on the generational catastrophe facing Sudan's children, seeking massive

amount of finances in total to provide health, nutrition, and safe learning spaces. These agencies operate under the Humanitarian Reset strategy, which prioritizes the most life threatening needs and seeks to bridge the gap between emergency aid and long term resilience, though they are increasingly forced to rely on local **Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs)** to reach the most dangerous zones.

### **3.3. Limitations of Past Measures**

Despite these mechanisms, international efforts have faced limitations. The primary obstacle is a massive **funding gap**; , humanitarian appeals remain severely underfunded, often receiving less than 40% of the required capital. Furthermore, the UN's inability to secure a humanitarian ceasefire means that aid delivery is entirely dependent on the decisions of military commanders. Administrative hurdles, such as the SAF led government's delay in granting visas and travel permits, have effectively neutralized many UN initiatives. Ultimately, without a dedicated protection force or a unified international stance against external military interference, the UN's measures remain reactive rather than preventive.

## **4. Core Challenges**

### **4.1. Aid Diversion & Blockades**


A central challenge in Sudan is the systematic diversion of aid by combatants. The RSF has been frequently accused of looting WFP warehouses and hijacking convoys to resupply its

fighters or control local populations. On the other side, the SAF utilizes its sovereign authority to impose blockades on regions it does not control, framing these restrictions as necessary to prevent arms smuggling. This administrative blockade turns bureaucratic paperwork into a lethal weapon, as food and medicine sit in ports while civilians in Darfur and Khartoum face starvation.

## 4.2. Security and Access Constraints

Sudan is currently one of the deadliest environments for humanitarian workers. Active frontlines, and the presence of militias make it nearly impossible to maintain stable supply routes. Many international NGOs have been forced to withdraw from hotspots like El Fasher and Kadugli due to direct attacks on their staff and facilities. The absence of access not only restricts

### Inadequate food consumption before and during the conflict



the delivery of goods, but also impedes the IPC famine monitoring process, as data collection from the most affected regions cannot be conducted safely.

### **4.3. Political Manipulation**

Both the SAF and RSF use humanitarian aid to control their political legitimacy. The SAF led government in Port Sudan often presents itself as the only legitimate channel for aid to prove its statehood to the international community. Conversely, the RSF attempts to set up parallel civilian administrations in its territories to distribute looted or diverted aid, seeking to win over local populations and gain a degree of political recognition. This manipulation forces humanitarian agencies into an impossible position where every delivery can be perceived as a political manipulation of one faction over the other.

### **4.4. Cross Border Issues**

The debate over the **Adré border crossing** with Chad highlights the clash between national sovereignty and humanitarian necessity. While the SAF has recently extended the opening of this crossing through March 2026, they frequently threaten to close it, alleging it is a conduit for UAE backed weapons for the RSF. For the UN, cross border aid (entering from neighboring countries) is essential because cross line aid (moving across internal frontlines) is often blocked by combatants. Navigating these border politics remains a constant hurdle for regional stability.



## **5. Possible Solutions & Policy Options**

### **5.1. Strengthening Monitoring & Accountability**

Delegates should consider the establishment of an **International Contact Group for Sudan** or an independent, AU UN joint monitoring body. This mechanism would be tasked with tracking aid deliveries from the port of entry to the final recipient, utilizing satellite imagery and digital tracking to prevent diversion. Furthermore, linking the removal of individual sanctions to specific humanitarian benchmarks such as the consistent issuance of visas or the cessation of attacks on aid workers could provide the necessities and policies to change the behavior of the warring generals.

### **5.2. Securing Humanitarian Corridors**

A more assertive policy option involves the creation of **demilitarized humanitarian corridors**. These routes would be negotiated truces along specific highways, potentially monitored by neutral international observers or African Union peace building units. By de politicizing these corridors and ensuring they are off limits for military movement, the international community can ensure a steady flow of supplies to famine threatened regions like Darfur and the Nuba Mountains regardless of the status of the broader civil war.

### **5.3. Enhancing Coordination Mechanisms**

Instead of relying solely on top down international aid, a viable solution is the **formal recognition and funding of local responders**. Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) have proven far more effective at reaching besieged areas than large UN agencies. Providing these local groups with diplomatic protection, direct financial grants, and technical support would decentralize the aid process, making it harder for the SAF and RSF to block assistance by simply targeting a single port or border crossing.

### **5.4. Addressing External Interference**

No humanitarian solution will be sustainable as long as regional actors continue to fuel the conflict with weapons and cash. Policy options include a **comprehensive, country wide arms embargo** enforced by secondary sanctions on companies and countries found to be in violation. By cutting off the fuel for the war specifically the gold for arms trade and external drone shipments the international community can force the SAF and RSF to the negotiating table, where humanitarian access must be the first item on the agenda.

## **6. Guiding Questions for Delegates**

- How can the UN ensure humanitarian access to RSF controlled territories without undermining the sovereignty of the Sudanese state?
- What specific mechanisms can be implemented to prevent the looting and diversion of food aid by paramilitary forces?
- Should the international community authorize cross border aid operations without the consent of the central government in cases of confirmed famine?
- How can the UN better protect and integrate local grassroots responders (ERRs) into the formal humanitarian architecture?
- What role should regional neighbors like Egypt, Chad, and the UAE play in a unified humanitarian monitoring framework?
- In what ways can the Joint Operational Committee or Quad countries be held accountable for their influence over the warring factions?
- What are the legal implications of designating the weaponization of aid as a crime against humanity in the context of the Sudan conflict?

## 7. Related Resources

1. World Bank. *The Sahel: Fragility, Conflict, and Climate Change*.  
[Central Sahel Monitor](#)
2. International Crisis Group. *The Central Sahel: Scene of New Climate Wars?*  
[The Central Sahel: Scene of New Climate Wars? | International Crisis Group](#)
3. UN Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sahel*.  
<https://undocs.org/S/2023/725>
4. United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 2396 (2017)*.  
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/2396\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2396(2017))
5. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). *Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)*.  
<https://www.icao.int/safety/UA>
6. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). *Autonomous Weapon Systems and IHL*.  
[Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Selected Issues | International Committee of the Red Cross](#)
7. Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. *Arms Trade Treaty Text and Implementation*.  
<https://thearmstradetreaty.org>
8. UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). *Regulating Armed Drones*.  
[UNIDIR Use of Uncrewed Aerial Systems by Non State Armed Groups Africa.pdf](#)
9. Small Arms Survey. *Emerging Military Technologies in the Sahel*.  
[SAS-BP-West-Africa-Sahel-Connection.pdf](#)
10. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). *Drones in Humanitarian Action*.  
[Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Humanitarian Response | OCHA](#)

### 7.1. Official UN Documents & Resolutions

- **UN Security Council Report (Sudan Page)**
  - **Link:** [Security Council Report Sudan](#)

- **Key 2025 Resolution: S/RES/2772 (2025)** – Extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on sanctions until March 2026.
- **UN Digital Library**
  - **Link:** [UN Digital Library](#)

## 7.2. Humanitarian Situation Reports (Real Time Data)

- **OCHA Sudan (Financial & Needs Tracking)**
  - **Link:** [OCHA Sudan Situation Reports](#)
- **ReliefWeb Sudan**
  - **Link:** [ReliefWeb Sudan Country Page](#)
- **IPC Global Platform (Famine Tracking)**
  - **Link:** [IPC Sudan Population Tracking](#)

## 7.3. Conflict Analysis & Weaponization of Aid

These sources help explain the Why behind the Weaponization of Aid and External Interference.

- **ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data)**
  - **Link:** [ACLED Sudan Dashboard](#)

- **UN Human Rights Council (Fact Finding Mission)**
  - **Link:** [OHCHR Sudan Page](#)

## 7.4. Key Stakeholder Trackers

- **The Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker**
  - **Link:** [Sudan Transparency Tracker](#)
- **International Crisis Group (Sudan)**
  - **Link:** [Crisis Group Sudan Reports](#)



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